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THE INFORMAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
A NEED FOR PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
AND REDUCED DISCRETION
by VICTOR L. STREIB*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1899 there have been continual attempts to modify
and improve the socio-legal system for delinquent children. The
present authorized or "formal" juvenile justice system is the
process that has responsibility and authority for public reaction
to juvenile delinquency. Included within that process is a collection of public and private agencies, agents, laws, rules and
policies dealing with juvenile delinquency. While fundamentally a legal system, the formal juvenile justice system has been
given a primarily social service mission designed to reduce delinquency while acting in the best interests of the child and society.1 The formal juvenile justice system is, however, made up of
police officers, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, probation officers
and other public officials quite like their criminal justice counterparts.
The formal juvenile justice system began as a "socialized"
legal system marked by nonrestrictive procedures and wide
agent discretion. After almost seventy years of operation in this
mode, the formal juvenile justice system was "constitutionalized"
2
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault
and officially changed to provide procedural due process for juvenile delinquent respondents. The discretion of system agents was
also greatly reduced. At about the same time, the "informal" juvenile justice system emerged.
The informal juvenile justice system is not an officially
established and authorized socio-legal system for dealing with
juvenile delinquency. However, the agents, agencies, rules and
policies of the informal juvenile justice system deal with and
directly affect delinquent children and often function in lieu of
the formal juvenile justice system. The informal juvenile justice
system is a collage of public and private social service, medical,
educational, and religious agencies. It is characterized by non* Assistant Professor of Forensic Studies at Indiana University;
B.S., Auburn University (1966); J.D., Indiana University (1970).

Mr.

Streib teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in criminal and juveile law. He has written several articles on juvenile justice and has
recently completed a book on this topic.

1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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restrictive procedures which often deny procedural fairness to
children and by broad, personal discretion which makes this
system essentially impossible for the child and/or his family to
challenge. These characteristics were condemned by the Supreme Court as they existed in the socialized model of the
formal juvenile justice system. 3 Rather than disappearing when
the constitutionalized version replaced the socialized version of
the formal juvenile justice system, the lack of procedural due
process and unchecked discretion simply emerged as characteristics of the informal juvenile justice system.
This article will discuss the characteristics of both the formal
and informal juvenile justice systems and will provide a brief
overview of the history of the formal juvenile justice system.
Several recommendations for change in the informal juvenile justice system will also be suggested.
ORIGINS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

From almost the beginning of Anglo-American law, children have been treated differently from adults who commit the
same acts. 4 For those children convicted of crimes under early
criminal law, the punishment administered was often less severe.
Even though convicted of capital offenses, death sentences were
often not carried out for children.5 In other cases, the jury
would refuse to convict if a child was facing the death penalty
for a comparatively minor offense- and the King's pardoning
power was used often to save children from execution. Thus,
not only did the law make children a special class of criminals
but the criminal justice system actually treated children more
"gently" than adults.6
The origin of juvenile corrections goes back at least to the
opening of the New York House of Refuge in 1825, 7 which was
established to meet the same kinds of needs the formal juvenile
justice system of the 1970's tries to meet. These needs include
avoidance of harsh criminal penalties for unfortunate children,
segregating "predelinquent" children from hardened delinquents, providing "proper" moral, ethical, political, and social
values and role models for deprived children, and treating such
3. Id.
4. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S. CAR. L. REv. 205 (1971).
5. Sanders, Some Early Beginnings of the Children's Court Move-

ment in England, in NATIONAL PROBATION ASS'N YEaBOOK (National
Council on Crime and Delinquency ed. 1945).
6. See generally Dyson & Dyson, Family Courts in the United
States, 8 J. FAM. L. 505 (1968).
7. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
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children as victims rather than offenders. Another example is
the Chicago Reform School established in 1855 to serve, not
punish, the same class of crime-prone children.8
The social and political roots of the juvenile court are
debatable. Traditionally it had been thought that the nineteenth
century reform movement gave birth to a scientific, objective,
and dispassionate juvenile court which would reform and develop wayward children.9 Alternatively, it has been persuasively
argued that the advent of the juvenile court heralded a retrenchment in correctional practice, a regression in poor-law policy,
and an encouragement to reach into children's private lives with
punitive policies disguised under the rhetoric of rehabilitation.10
In any event, there is reason to believe that early criminal courts
traditionally took a somewhat fatherly and protective attitude
toward children. It is debatable whether this was an offer of
humanitarian assistance or merely a form of parental punishment. This special attitude toward children, however, was written into law and required of juvenile courts."
Illinois initiated the first formal juvenile court on July 1,
Several states soon began developing juvenile courts
based upon the Illinois model. By 1912, almost half the states
had juvenile court legislation and every state except two had
such legislation by 1925. The federal government passed a
juvenile court act in 1938.13 Thus, by 1925 it is fair to conclude that the formal juvenile justice system existed in all critical
elements, in law if not in fact. Unfortunately, however, the
juvenile
states were somewhat less expeditious in implementing
14
justice legislation than they were in enacting it.
1899.12

In sum, the concept of special treatment of children under
law is several hundred years old. The first juvenile court act is
77 years old. The concept of special correctional institutions for
children is at least 150 years old and a somewhat cohesive
system of juvenile justice is at least 50 years old. Thus, the
formal juvenile justice system that "began" in 1899 had a long
8. Id. at 1207.
9. See D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRACTICE IN A
UNIQUE COURT § 1.1 (No. 4 1974); Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court:

Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, 18
CRIME & DEL. 68 (1972).
10. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969). See also Fox, supra note
7, at 1193-95.
11. See Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME &
DEL.457 (1973).
12. Act of April 21, 1899 Ill. Laws §§ 1, 21 (1899).
13. Act of June 16, 1938, ch. 486, § 1, 52 STAT. 764. See generally
Ruppert, Juvenile Criminal Proceedings in Federal Courts, 18 LOYOLA L.
REV. 133 (1971).
14. See T. JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

5 (1975).
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prior history of special treatment for children upon which to
base its operating principles.
THE FORMAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Socialized Era of the Formal Juvenile Justice System
From 1899 until 1967, the formal juvenile justice system
operated under a concept of law and justice "so altered as to be
virtually unrecognizable in any traditional sense." 1
Rather
than a legal system which reacted to violations of the law or
which provided a forum for resolution of legal disputes, the
socialized juvenile justice system attempted to intervene before
serious violations of law occurred. The socialized juvenile justice system tried to predict future behavior of the individual
involved, rather than deliberating over evidence as to past criminal acts of the individual. Rather than provide typical governmental services to a citizen, the socialized juvenile justice system
was to offer approximately the same care, custody, and discipline that a loving parent would offer to a child. The socialized
juvenile justice system is often presented as an adaptation of the
medical model as it might be applied to troubled children, i.e.,
"early identification, diagnosis, prescription of treatment, implementation of therapy, and cure or rehabilitation under 'aftercare'
supervision."16

Beginning in 1899 with separate legislation, separate court
hearings, probation supervision, and institutional segregation,
the socialized juvenile justice system set out to achieve the lofty
goals established for it. Unfortunately, it is now generally
accepted that these goals were never achieved.' 7 However,
during the almost 70 years of its existence it progressively pursued those goals. This socialized juvenile justice system embraced five pivotal philosophical elements:
(1) The superior rights of the state over the rights of the
child and his parents;
(2) Individualized justice for each child;
(3) The juvenile status of delinquent as somewhat different
from and less serious than the adult status of criminal;
(4) Informal, non-criminal procedure instead of legalistic,
criminal procedure; and
15. See F. FAUST & P. BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY:
READINGS, CASES AND COMMENTS 145 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FAUST
& BRANTINGHAM].

16. Id. at 147.
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966).
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A remedial, preventative, correctional purpose rather
than a punitive, threatening purpose.' 8

A key element separating the socialized juvenile justice
system from the constitutionalized juvenile justice system is informal, non-criminal procedure. The socialized juvenile justice
system was functionally much like the present constitutionalized
juvenile justice system, except for the legal steps and functions
required by Gault and its progeny. A child was commonly
brought to court by a police officer or other responsible adult,
such as a school counselor, neighbor, or parent. The judge
would consider the case in an informal conference and examine
the allegations against the child and any evidence in favor of the
child. Based upon this conference and consideration of the
evidence, the judge would decide upon the child's delinquent
status. If delinquency was found, the judge would order an
appropriate disposition, which could be probation, institutionalization, or some other "treatment" mode. Thus, all of the basic
functions were performed in the socialized juvenile justice system as are performed in the constitutionalized juvenile justice
system, albeit in a much more informal and perfunctory manner.
The socialized juvenile justice system simply left presentation of
the child's side of the case to the same system agent responsible
for presentation of the state's side of the case.
The socialized juvenile justice system diverged from the
comparatively legalistic criminal justice system in 1899 and
spent perhaps the first thirty or forty years of its sixty-eight year
life trying to match its rhetoric with action. It progressively
became more and more "socialized" by continuing to try new
and more individualized treatment techniques to react to delinquency. The constitutionalized juvenile justice system, which
officially replaced the socialized system in 1967, was also more
rhetoric than action during the first few years of its life.19 Only
recently has the constitutionalized system become what could be
called truly legalistic or constitutionalized.
ConstitutionalizedEra of the Formal Juvenile Justice System
The term "constitutionalized" should not mislead one into
assuming that the socialized juvenile justice system did not
operate under the provisions of the United States Constitution
and the various state constitutions. The formal juvenile justice
system has always been a system of law and as such has always
18. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some Major

Problems, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A BooK OF READINGS 362-63 (R.
Giallombardo ed. 1966).
19. Lefstein, Stapleton, and Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc. Rsv. 491 (1969).
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However, the Warren Court

been governed by constitutions.

found many applications of constitutional privileges and rights
in the adult criminal justice area during the 1960's and subsequently transplanted most of them into the formal juvenile justice system for the benefit of juvenile delinquents. The constitutionalized era of the formal juvenile justice system began in
1967, the year the United States Supreme Court decided In re
Gault.20 After Gault, juvenile courts were required to follow
certain guidelines established by this decision. Several juvenile
courts had been following similar legalistic guidelines before
1967, yet, even more juvenile courts were following the socialized, informal guidelines after 1967. Thus, the terminal points
of the constitutionalized juvenile justice system are no more
clear-cut than the terminal points of the socialized juvenile
justice system. Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis, there
are two, rather distinct eras of the formal juvenile justice system.
The constitutionalization of the formal juvenile justice system was anticipated in 1966 by the Supreme Court:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years
raise serious questions as to whether actual performance meas-

ures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable
the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional
guaranties applicable to adults. .

.

. There is evidence, in fact,

that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
care and regenerative treataccorded to adults nor the solicitous
21
ment postulated for children.
Other earlier cases had indicated that the fourteenth amendment
and incorporated constitutional rights apply to children as well
as to adults.

22

While Kent v. United States had held that the waiver hearing must respect the essentials of constitutional due process and
fair treatment, Gault held that this requirement also applies to
the adjudicatory hearings as a requirement of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Under Gault, due process includes proper notice of the
charges and hearings to the child and his parents, the right to
effective counsel for the juvenile delinquent at the adjudicatory
hearing, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right not to be a witness against one's self.
Within a few years after Gault, the United States Supreme
Court had decided two other major cases dealing with the
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
22. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.

596 (1948).
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fourteenth amendment and the formal juvenile justice system. In
In re Winship,2 the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is among the essentials of due process and fair treatment
required by Gault during the adjudicatory stage. The Court's
opinion was limited to cases in which the juvenile is charged
with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult. The primary bases for this holding were the reasonable
doubt standard within fourteenth amendment due process, the
comparable seriousness of a felony prosecution and a finding of
delinquency resulting in loss of liberty for several years, and a
belief that the reasonable doubt standard would not destroy the
beneficial aspects of the juvenile process.
The Winship majority opinion had reaffirmed, just three
years after Gault, the requirements of fourteenth amendment
due process as they affect the adjudicatory hearing within the
formal juvenile justice system. However, the majority opinion
was written by Mr. Justice Brennan during the waning days of
the so-called liberal Warren Court. A harbinger of things to
come might well be Mr. Chief Justice Burger's persuasive dissent:
. . . I dissent from further strait-jacketing of an already overly
restricted system. What the juvenile court system needs is
not more but less of the trappings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires breathing
room and flexibility in order to 24survive, if it can survive the
repeated assaults from this Court.
One year later the United States Supreme Court. issued a
majority opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice Burger joined. In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,25 the Court considered the last of the
trappings of fourteenth amendment due process: right to trial
by jury. The Court held that trial by jury in the formal juvenile
justice system adjudicatory hearing is not a constitutional requirement. Taking exhaustive measures to justify this holding,
Mr. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion argued that the Court
had regularly refrained from imposing all criminal procedural
rights upon the formal juvenile justice system, that influential
advisory agencies had not recommended jury trials for juvenile
proceedings, and that the various state formal juvenile justice
systems needed the freedom to experiment in their attempts to
achieve the high goals of the formal juvenile justice system.
In Kent and Gault, Mr. Justice Fortas wrote majority opinions which revised fundamental premises of the formal juvenile
justice system. Juvenile court judges were no longer permitted
23. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

24. Id. at 376 (Burger C J., dissenting).
25. 403 U.S. 528 (19715.
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to ignore procedural niceties in order to do what they thought
best for the child. The Court had concluded that the formal
juvenile justice system was incapable of matching action with
rhetoric, largely because of the significant gap between social
scientists' aspirations and abilities, and the apparent lack of
funding and personnel to implement the social scientific knowledge that was available. However, in the Burger dissent in
Winship and the Blackmun plurality opinion in McKeiver, we
find a rekindling of faith in the ability of the socialized juvenile
justice system to achieve its goals. It seems reasonable to suggest that the formal juvenile justice system is now coming back
to a middle ground between the socialized juvenile justice system
and the constitutionalized juvenile justice system. The formal
juvenile justice system of the 1970's may be described most
accurately as a synthesis of the two previous eras of the formal
26
juvenile justice system.
The Formal Juvenile Justice System
as a Legal System for Children
From its beginning in 1899, the juvenile court has been a

court of equity with administrative functions incidental to equity
jurisdiction. 27 The first juvenile court was not a new and
independent court but was simply one of several jurisdictions of
a general circuit court. As a court, the juvenile court carries
with it the aura of courts in the Anglo-American common law
tradition. Juvenile court judges, prosecutors, the child's counsel, and other court officers are not likely to forget they are in a
courtroom, which puts inherent limits upon the informality and
procedural liberties so common in juvenile justice rhetoric. 28
Children and their parents may also feel the sense of dignity and
"sacredness" found in our courtrooms. The wood paneling,
judicial dais, and prominent flags present the unmistakable
impression of the majesty of government. If the juvenile court
were an administrative agency instead of a court, it would have
rules and regulations by which to operate but would not have
that sense of awe that a courtroom and a judge may inspire.
All other functions and subsystems of the formal juvenile
justice system are also first and foremost parts of a legal system.
For example, the police/investigatory subsystem is operated primarily by police officers and other police employees. This first
subsystem of the formal juvenile justice system is so similar to its
26. See FAUST & BRANTINGHAM, supra note 15, at 360.

27. See 0. KETCHAM & M. PAULSEN,
ING TO JUVENILE COURTS (1967).
28. See S. DAVIS, RIGHTS

(1974).
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criminal justice counterpart in its major functions as to render
the differences more of academic curiosity than of practical
importance. Police investigation of offenses, apprehension and
questioning of juvenile suspects, examination of evidence, and
other typical functions at this stage of the formal juvenile justice
system are governed by legal rules and principles almost identical to those of the criminal justice system. 29 In some particulars, however, the formal juvenile justice system is more restrictive than the criminal justice system. For example, detention of
a juvenile after apprehension but before appearance before a
judicial officer may be more restricted for children than for
adults in similar circumstances, e.g., no right to bail.
The other stages and functions of the formal juvenile justice system are similar to those of their criminal justice counterparts. Probation officers supervise an official, legally prescribed
correctional program called probation. The rules of probation
must be kept within legal limits. The power and authority of
the probation officer is defined by statute and other primary
sources of law, as are the rights of the probationer to receive
or reject proferred treatment. Also, revocation of probationary status can occur only after a hearing complete with evidence, witnesses, and lawyers.30
While juvenile institutions act in many ways like social
service agencies, they are nevertheless governed by law. The
juvenile institution is no less a legalistic agency within a legal
system than is a criminal prison within the criminal justice
system.
The formal juvenile justice system is clearly a legal system
governed by constitutions, statutes, and case law, and influenced
by the long history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 3' Concurrently, the formal juvenile justice system has been given a
largely social service mission to accomplish. Let us now examine this dimension of juvenile justice.
The Formal Juvenile Justice System as
a Social Welfare System for Children
Although cloaked in the garb of the American legal system,
32
the formal juvenile justice system is also a social welfare system
29. See P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AND THE LAw, §§ 17.1-17.6
(1971).
30. See generally Klapmuts, Children's Rights-The Legal Rights of
Minors in Conflict with Law or Social Custom, 4 CRIME & DEL. LIT. 449
(1972).
31. See

R.

TROJANOWICZ,

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY:

CONCEPTS

(1973).
32. See Tenney, The Utopian World of Juvenile Courts, 383

AND

CONTROL

101 (1969)

[hereinafter cited as Tenney].
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in that it is a collection of private and public services attempting
to ameliorate social pathology through a systematic method of

adjusting an individual's relationships with other persons and
with the wider social environment. More specifically, the formal juvenile justice system is a collection of public and private
youth-serving agencies, attempting to reduce juvenile delinquency through a systematic method of modifying the juvenile's
behavior so as to improve his personal and communal relation-

ships. Many prominent youth-serving agencies, for example the
Boy Scouts of America and the Young Men's Christian Association, are similar social welfare systems for children and differ
from the formal juvenile justice system more in their scope than
in their purpose.
'Characterization of the formal juvenile justice system as
more of a social welfare system than a legal system is not new or
unorthodox:
1. The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like
that of other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy
rather than in corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as
civil rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically
engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society
rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are
to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child
and protection for society,
not to fix criminal responsibility,
33
guilt and punishment.
As a result of this fundamental social welfare premise, this
"cpeculiar system for juveniles" 34 historically did not follow the
traditional legal rules of criminal proceedings or even the much
less demanding legal rules of civil proceedings.3" Juvenile justice agents were not trying to seek revenge or punish the child
but were simply trying to provide him with proper parental
custody and protection. "
As a protective social welfare system, the formal juvenile
justice system is given as much legal freedom as can be tolerated
and still remain within the family of legal systems. The formal
juvenile justice system is more accurately described as existing in
the overlapping area between the intersecting circles of legal
systems and social welfare systems. Of course, all legal systems are partly social welfare systems and vice versa, but the
formal juvenile justice system seems to straddle the centermost
point between the two.
33. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).

34. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
35. Id. at 17 n.22.
36. See Edwards, In Loco Parentis: Definitions, Application and Implication, 23 S. CAR. L. Rsv. 114 (1971).
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JUVENILE JUSTICE GOALS,
OBJECTIVES, AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES

Juvenile justice has been burdened with goals and objectives that are extremely difficult to attain. In a very real sense,
juvenile justice is asked to do what the child's parents, local
community, school system, etc. have not been able to do. The
formal juvenile justice system must seek the same goals and
objectives any "good, American parent" would seek for his or
her child 37 and not simply punish the child. As stated in Kent,
"It]he State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge." 38 Indeed, rehabilitation of the child is the
predominant goal of the entire formal juvenile justice system. 39
Obviously, society is best protected from future delinquent behavior if a child is successfully rehabilitated. Our society has
assumed, apparently without argument, that the child is best
served by the formal juvenile justice system if he is taught
to avoid delinquent behavior in the future. Thus, rehabilitation
of the child serves the two masters of the formal juvenile justice
system: the best interests of the child and the best interests of
society.
By its very existence and ability to act, the formal juvenile
justice system should deter delinquency among all children. To
effectively deter delinquent behavior, the formal juvenile justice
system must be characterized by thorough investigation of delinquent acts, swift apprehension of delinquent children, prompt
and accurate adjudication of the facts, and imposition of just
dispositions.

40

Operating principles of the formal juvenile justice system
include those inherited from law, those inherited from social
service, and those required by the practicalities of governmental
operations. American-legal concepts require the formal juvenile
justice system to follow the precepts of the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment. 41 These legal operating principles are
today much like the operating principles of the American criminal justice system, particularly in such specifics as the rights to
counsel, notice, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a fair evidentiary hearing.4 2
37. Id.
38. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966).

39.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-

TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN

A FREE SOCIETY 80

(1967)

[hereinafter cited as PRESmENT'S COMMISSION].

40. Id. at 88.

41. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. See S. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
(1972).

MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE
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Operating principles inherited from the social service origins of the formal juvenile justice system require it to serve the
needs of its clientele. Thus, the formal juvenile justice system
must determine the needs of the particular child in question and
do its best to serve those needs. Likewise, the needs of the
society it serves must be determined and met to the extent
43
possible.
The practicalities of governmental operations dictate that
the formal juvenile justice system live within reasonable budgets,
hire agents from the available pool of candidates, treat delinquent children with therapeutic skills limited by man's knowledge, and operate within the vagaries of modern society. Thus,
the legal and social service exhortations concerning rehabilitation of the delinquent child may often be negated by the practical reality of limited financial resources to provide psychiatric
care or, more fatally, by the present lack of socio-psycho-medical knowledge about the kind of behavior being treated. Regardless of the goals, objectives, and operating principles of the
legal scholars and social service theorists, the formal juvenile
justice system must deal with children who live in a real world.
INFORMAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM OPERATIONS

An Overview
Although Gault seemed to have sounded the death knell
for the socialized juvenile justice system and its twin characteristics of informal procedures and unchecked discretion, the socialized juvenile justice system did not die but simply changed its
name and went "underground." The present informal juvenile
justice system has taken over the attitudes and characteristics of
the socialized juvenile justice system and has largely displaced
the formal constitutionalized juvenile justice system. The current popularity of diversion from juvenile court has resulted in a
revival of the procedures for handling alleged delinquents that
were specifically and emphatically denounced in Gault.
The informal juvenile justice system now exists parallel to
and often in competition with the formal juvenile justice system.
The informal juvenile justice system is that collage of social
service agencies which serve the youth of a community but
which are not a regular part of the formal juvenile justice
system. Such agencies are the recipients of referrals from formal juvenile justice system agencies and include youth service
bureaus, drug abuse clinics, community mental health clinics,
church youth groups, family counseling agencies, and regular
43. See Tenney, supra note 32.
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probation officers acting in an unofficial capacity in supervising
a child under "informal probation."
This latest era of juvenile justice might be described as the
bifurcation of juvenile justice into formal and informal systems
rather than a synthesis of socialized and constitutionalized positions.4 4 Many jurisdictions have formalized this bifurcation by
legislation which channels the child who violates criminal laws
into the formal system and the child whose delinquent acts are
not criminal law violations into the informal system. 45 Often
the formal juvenile system serves as a backstop for the informal
juvenile justice system, allowing system agents to threaten the
child with being processed through the formal juvenile justice
system if he does not "volunteer" for informal supervision.
A functional analysis of the informal juvenile justice system
would reveal almost exactly the same functions being performed
as in the formal system with the exclusion of the juvenile court
judge, the strict legal procedures and the formalistic juvenile
court hearings. The misbehaving child is reported to an informal juvenile justice system agent, an investigation is conducted,
a decision as to the child's misbehavior is made by an informal
juvenile justice agent, remedial action is designed for that child
and is administered by the informal juvenile justice system.
Although the child is not formally adjudged to be a delinquent,
the action taken against the child is typically quite similar to that
which would have been imposed by the formal juvenile justice
system. Such action includes counseling by a probation officer
("informal probation"), treatment by a psychologist or psychiatrist in a community mental health program, special tutoring for
school, counseling and assistance for the entire family, and
admittance to private institutions quite comparable to state juve46
nile institutions.
While the formal juvenile justice system is composed primarily of police, prosecutors, respondents' attorneys, judges,
probation officers, and institution counselors, the informal system is composed of school counselors, probation officers acting
in an unofficial capacity, youth counselors from a variety of
community agencies, and persons working within private institutions. The variety of community agencies differs widely according to the community, but typical agencies are youth service
bureaus, youth crisis centers, drug counseling services, youth
employment referral services, and similar agencies.
44. Shullenberger & Murphy, The Crisis in Juvenile Courts-Is Bifurcation an Answer?, 55 CH. B. REc. 117 (1973).
45. See F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE PROCESS (1971).
46. See J. MORRIS, FIRST OFFENDER: A VOLUNTEER PROGRAM FOR
YOUTH IN TROUBLE wrrH THE LAw

(1970).
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Often an individual agency will constitute the entire informal juvenile justice system for a child. For example, the youth
service bureau might be requested by a frustrated mother to
intervene in her child's life. An agent of the bureau will investigate the situation and talk with the parents and the child. The
agent will decide if the child is "guilty," whether treatment is
required, and if so, will design and implement a program for
that child and family. In this common example, the bureau is
functionally the entire informal juvenile justice system from ini47
tial report of the problem to imposition of the remedial action.
Points of Entry
A child may be thrust into the informal juvenile justice
system by various means. One common way is for the child
who commits a delinquent act to be handled informally by the
police. The child is counseled by the police and/or referred to a
social service agency for counseling and then released from the
formal juvenile justice system. 48 This is not based upon any
legal coercion or threat of bringing the child into court, such as
is typically the means by which a child is encouraged to seek
counseling at subsequent points in the formal juvenile justice
system.49 Rather, in this situation the counseling agent must
depend upon the sincere desire of the .child and his parents to
seek rehabilitation. Predictably, these instances are rare. Alternatively, the act of delinquency may simply be remembered
by police officials and used to justify more legalistic handling of
a subsequent provable offense by the child.
More specifically, the child may be placed in the informal
juvenile justice system either by the individual police officer
("street adjustment") or by the police agency acting through its
juvenile division ("station adjustment"). 50 An example of how
the individual police officer could activate the informal juvenile justice system is to lecture the child like a stern father,
generally observe his behavior for some time thereafter, and
then decide whether or not the child has benefited from the
advice. If the child seems to have responded favorably to the
47. See S. NORMAN, THE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU: A KEY TO DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1972) [hereinafter cited as NORMAN].
48. D.

PURSUIT, POLICE PROGRAMS FOR PREVENTING CRIME AND DELIN-

QUENCY (1972).

49. R. Sundeen, A Study of Factors Related to Police Diversion of

Juveniles:

Departmental Policy and Structure, Community Attachment,

and Professionalization of the Police, 1972 (unpublished dissertation,
University of Michigan).
50. See Stratton Crisis Intervention Counseling and Police Diversion
from the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Literature, 25 Juv.
JUST. 44 (May 1974).
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lecture, the previous delinquent act is forgiven. If the child
does not seem to have responded favorably to the officer's suggestions, the officer must decide whether to simply forget about
the case or to consider some other possible option. 51 This "street
adjustment" of the child by an individual police officer may be
more frequent in a small town situation, where regular surveillance of the local children is an almost daily occurrence, than in
the more impersonal large city or urban area. The propensity for
"street adjustment" of a delinquency case also varies greatly
2
between individual officers and between police agencies.
In lieu of the "street adjustment," the police officer could
apprehend the child and take him into custody. 53 Following the
records preparation process, the police agency must then decide
whether to refer the child to the juvenile court or channel him
into the informal juvenile justice system. This latter process,
often referred to as "station adjustment,' 5 4 occurs when the
decision to take responsibility for counseling a child is made at
the police station as a result of an agency deliberation. It is not
unusual for "station adjustments" to involve elaborate hearings
and the imposition of sanctions by the police agency. 55 These
sanctions may include a curfew, restricted association with certain persons, or counseling. In this situation, police agencies
function as the entire informal juvenile justice system. Police
investigate the reported offense, apprehend the suspected delinquent, gather and present evidence in a hearing, and decide the
.degree of involvement by the child in forbidden activities. They
then decide whether or not the child needs treatment. If treatment is required, the police design, institute and monitor the
proper program.
A child may also enter the informal juvenile justice system
at the court screening stage of the formal juvenile justice system.
When the police formally refer an alleged delinquent to juvenile
court, probation officers perform a screening function to divert
those cases that do not warrant court action. In some instances,
the case may be dismissed. Even if the screening officer does
not dismiss the case outright, it is still possible, even probable,
that the case will not proceed to the filing of a formal court
petition alleging delinquent behavior, " The case may be han51. See Somerville, A Study of the Preventive Aspect of Police Work
with Juveniles, 1969 CRIM. L. REV. 407.
52. See R.. KOBETz, THE POLICE ROLE AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

(1971).
53. See Klein, Rosenweig & Bates, The Ambiguous Juvenile Arrest,
13 CRIM. 78 (1975).

54. PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION, supra note 39, at 82-83.
55. See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).

56. See

WELF.

Croxton,

553 (1967).

The Juvenile Court: Some Current Issues, 46
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dled informally in two typical ways, either of which are means
of utilizing the informal juvenile justice system.T The screening officer may refer the delinquent suspect to a social service agency such as a youth services bureau for counseling and
any other services which might be required. 58 If the referral produces favorable results, the delinquent suspect will not
go to juvenile court. Whether or not the referral results are
favorable is a decision typically made by the screening officer at
a subsequent time. This decision is based upon information
from the social service agency to whom the child was referred. If
the delinquent suspect does not respond favorably to counseling,
the screening officer or comparable agent must decide whether
the case should be reconsidered. If no apparent value would
result from such a reconsideration, the delinquent suspect could
be dismissed. The alternative would be to rescreen the case to
determine if other action would be more appropriate. In effect,
the informal juvenile justice system is backed up by the threat of
resort to the formal juvenile justice system. If the child falters
during informal counseling, he is "threatened" with juvenile
court.
If the child is not diverted into the informal juvenile justice
system by this point, one last opportunity exists. The diversion
may take place near the end of the adjudicatory hearing. That
is, the juvenile court judge may withhold judgment and choose
an informal alternative for the child. 9 The "most informal"
alternative would be for the child to be released. This might
occur if the delinquent acts have been proven but the child and
family have been undergoing counseling and seem to have resolved their problems. Consistent with the goals of juvenile justice, the child avoids a formal adjudication of delinquency and
the stigma attached thereto.
More commonly in this "last chance" diversion into the
informal system, the child would either be placed on "voluntary," informal probation or would be referred to a social service
agency for counseling. "Voluntary" or informal probation requires the child to perform in an almost identical fashion as he
would be required to perform on formal probation but no formal
pronouncement of delinquency or probationary status is in-

volved. Typically, if the child refuses to "volunteer" for informal probation, the judge adjudicates him delinquent and the
formal juvenile justice system continues to handle the case. If
57. Ferster & Courtless, The Intake Process in the Affluent County
Juvenile Court, 22 HAST. L.J. 1127 (1971).

58. See

NORMAN,

supra note 47.

59. See Snyder, Impact of the Juvenile Court Hearing on the Child,
17 CRIME& DEL. 180 (1971).
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the child does "volunteer" for informal probation, he waives
such basic constitutional rights as the right to counsel, right to a
dispositional hearing, right to challenge evidence, etc. The
child is simply processed by the informal juvenile justice system
in whatever manner seems appropriate, with the child having no
realistic opportunity to object or challenge decisions.
If the child is placed on informal probation and performs
satisfactorily, typically he will be discharged from informal probation and depart from both the formal and informal juvenile
justice systems. If he does not perform satisfactorily on informal probation, he might still be released from both systems if it
seems fruitless to have him placed in a formal correctional
situation. However, it could be recommended that the child
return to the formal juvenile justice system and that the juvenile
court judge enter the judgment previously withheld.
A similar sequence occurs if the child is referred to a social
service agency for counseling. If the child responds favorably to
counseling, he departs from the systems. If he responds unfavorably to counseling, he may be released from the formal
juvenile justice system or referred back, adjudicated delinquent,
and sent on to a formal dispositional hearing. The decision as
to whether the child performed satisfactorily on informal probation or responded favorably to counseling is made ultimately
by the juvenile court judge. The judge acts upon the report
and advice of the probation officer monitoring the child's performance in the informal juvenile justice system.
In the above described manner, the formal juvenile justice
system diverts a majority of alleged delinquents into the informal
juvenile justice system and, in effect, transfers authority to the
informal system to do what is best for the child and society. In
so doing, the procedural fairness requirements ordered by Gault
are rendered inapplicable since participation in the informal
juvenile justice system is "voluntary." The child can effectively
be denied the right to notice of charges, an attorney, the right to
remain silent, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
right to any specific level of proof by the informal system.
To return to the medical model and parent/child analogy,
the juvenile is seen as a sick infant and the informal juvenile
justice system is the parent/physician/child psychologist. The
informal system does not permit the juvenile to deny the delinquency manifested by the misbehavior, just as the physician
does not permit the sick infant to deny the disease indicated by
the fever, coughing, and other physiological symptoms. The
informal system, as would the physician, simply observes the
child very closely, diagnoses the problem, and orders the cure to
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be implemented expeditiously. To give children a concrete
opportunity to prevent some of these symptoms from being
examined or to prevent implementation of the cure would seem
to be improper behavior for a parent or a physician, or for a
social agency serving in those roles.
Informal system agents may see themselves as comparable to
the laudable social worker who discovers an abandoned baby on
the front stoop and takes in the perishable foundling to provide it
with food, clothing, shelter, and the multitude of other ministrations needed by such an infant. Suggesting that such a servant
of humanity should be restricted in providing this essential rescue or should have to prove in a court (beyond a reasonable
doubt) that the foundling needs such rescue would test the limits
of community tolerance. To suggest that the abandoned baby has
a right to remain on the front stoop unbothered by overly-eager
governmental agents is assumed to blaspheme conventional com-

mon sense. 60
As extreme as the above analogy is, it reveals the ramifications of the characteristics of the informal juvenile justice system. We punish persons only reluctantly and only after we are
certain that we must. We help persons eagerly and do not wait
until we are absolutely certain of their need. Therefore, the
formal juvenile justice system may seem irrational because it
requires procedural patience and a high degree of certainty
before we can help a needy child. Thus, the informal system
responds to fill a perceived void by serving children's needs
while avoiding the procedural "red tape."
Consider other child-serving agencies today as a comparison. Is it not typical in agencies whose purpose it is to help
needy children to want to do so with as little resistance from
outsiders as possible? Do charitable organizations expect the
recipients of their free goods and services to challenge these gifts
and to exercise extensive rights to refuse them? Similarly, few
have challenged the actions of the informal juvenile justice
system in the face of its popularity. Few have considered the
informal system's striking resemblance to the socialized model of
the formal juvenile justice system which the Supreme Court had
tried to eliminate almost ten years ago. However, many of the
actions of the informal system disregard the generally accepted
minimal standards of procedural fairness and must be scrutinized very closely.
60. See Brennan & Klinduka, Role Expectations of Social Workers

and Lawyers in Juvenile Court, 16 CRIME & DEL. Q. 191 (1970).
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

It is not recommended that the informal juvenile justice
system be abolished or even modified in any drastic manner.

The Supreme Court tried to abolish the socialized juvenile justice system and it reappeared as the informal juvenile justice
system. If we try to abolish the informal system, we can assume
it too will reincarnate. However, the informal juvenile justice
system must be modified on behalf of the children it affects.
First, there is a great deal of pressure on the allegedly
delinquent child to "voluntarily" participate in the informal
system. For the child accused of an act of delinquency, the only
alternative to "voluntary" cooperation with the informal system
is to be processed through the formal system. In theory, the
only coercing factor is the "threat" of justice, i.e., to be processed by the formal system in a lawful and just manner and
be dealt with as decided by the formal system. This alternative
of formal system "justice" entails much more than is suggested.
Consider the emotional impact imposed upon a child as a result
of being apprehended by the police, transported to the police
station in the back of a patrol car and subjected to the dehumanizing records-preparation process. Moreover, the adjudicatory hearing can be emotionally damaging to a child. The last
resort of the formal juvenile justice system-the state juvenile
institution-may very well irreparably harm the child. This is
the "justice" with which we threaten the child in order to coerce
him into "volunteering" for the informal juvenile justice system.
The coercion may begin early in the formal system. A
school counselor may tell the child and his parents that unless
the child subjects himself to the informal system the school
counselor will have no choice but to report the delinquent acts to
the police. A frustrated parent may threaten to call the police
unless the child "volunteers" for the informal system, or a
juvenile police officer may suggest counseling by an informal
system agency in lieu of formal referral of the case to the
juvenile probation office. The primary point of transfer to the
informal system, however, is the court screening juncture. The
juvenile probation officer examines the case and may recommend informal or unofficial probation. The alternative, of
course, is the filing of a formal court petition alleging delinquency. At all of these points the child can choose to "volunteer" for
whatever informal counseling or other treatment program is
being recommended and thus avoid any further punitive
processing by the formal system.
It is apparent that the child typically does not have any
effective means of avoiding the informal juvenile justice system.
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All of the apparently knowledgeable adults are recommending
the painless, attractive alternative as a favor to the child and
working with him to avoid the harsh, punitive alternative. The
child is told that the alternative to counseling is formal court
action and the ultimate punishment, the institution, is expressly
or impliedly threatened. It is critical to realize that the child has
no defense attorney or neutral, objective, knowledgeable person
from whom to seek advice. When the probation officer or
police officer tells the child that they have ample evidence to
send him to an institution, the child has no means of challenging
that assertion or even making an educated guess as to that
possibility. The child does not realize the 'extreme rarity of
institutionalization or know what type of punishment to expect.
In short, the child is at the complete mercy of the informal juvenile justice system agent and has no other source of objective and
accurate information with which to make a decision.
The primary problem is not the intentions or services provided by the informal system agents and agencies, but rather is
the fact that this "voluntary" system for serving children in
trouble is not in any meaningful way "voluntary." The solution
lies not in doing away with or radically altering the informal
system but in making its services available to children and
families on a strictly voluntary basis without the present coercion
which pervades the system. Making the system truly voluntary
should increase the ability of the system to serve children by
providing services that children sincerely desire rather than imposing services through threat of institutionalization.
Several means exist for solving this problem. The formal
juvenile justice system agents who divert children into the informal system can be required to eliminate their coercive techniques and simply but completely inform children and their
families of the availability of various services. The agents and
agencies making up the informal juvenile justice system could
saturate the community with information about the availability
of their services and actively go into the community to provide
services to anyone asking for them. In order to provide an
effective check on the over-zealous "child-helper," we could
require that every child and family receive competent, personal
legal advice as to the strength of the case against them and the
probable outcome of the case if continued within the formal
juvenile justice system. This legal advice would tend to offset
the biased claims of police and probation officers as to the legal
merit of cases they have prepared. The end result would be to
continue to make available the present variety of services to
children on an informal basis and make them truly voluntary.
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Otherwise, we are subjecting children to juvenile justice, either
formal or informal, through threats and coercion without any
realistic means for the child to evaluate his situation.
A second major problem with the informal juvenile justice
system is the unclear and inconsistent goals and operating principles of its various agencies. Analyses of the formal system
reveal many similar inconsistencies within a system that is much
more cohesive and single-minded than the informal system.
Although the formal system has no system manager, there are
relatively few agencies to manage. Moreover, all of the formal
juvenile justice agencies accept or operate within legal guidelines
and requirements as established by Gault and its progeny. That
is, the formal system is at least partly a legal system governed by
and operating under law.
The informal juvenile justice system is not a legal system in
any meaningful way, at least not to the extent of the formal
system. So long as the child and the family are "voluntarily"
participating in a dispositional mode, few restrictions are placed
upon agencies providing services. In fact, the informal system
is made up of agencies with a variety of fundamental premises.
One agency might be part of a fundamentalist protestant church
group trying to "save" all children they counsel. Another agency might be staffed by local college students whose drug counseling concerning marijuana might be strikingly different from
the drug counseling by the juvenile probation officer. A rural
communal counseling agency might teach children that getting
back to the land and leading a natural life is the only solution
while a neighborhood youth club teaches how to cope with life
in the urban neighborhood. Confusion could well be the result
for the child shuttled around from agency to agency and from
counselor to counselor.
Conflicting goals and principles make evaluation of a
child's "success" within the informal juvenile justice system almost impossible to measure meaningfully. Is the city teenager
who does not get along well in the rural communal setting a
failure? Is the child who accepts Jesus Christ as his personal
savior a success? Perhaps we must turn to such effectiveness
and success measures as reducing the frequency and/or seriousness of future acts of delinquency. Accuracy in measurement is
quite difficult even in the formal system where the child is at
least under some official supervision and where repeated acts of
delinquency would be somewhat difficult to hide. In the informal system, the child is under very loose supervision, if any, and
often the supervisors will not report every misstep by the child,
unlike official agents of the formal system who might feel a
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professional duty to report all wrongful conduct. The college
student/drug counselor may be less willing to report to the
police his counselee's admission of continued marijuana use than
would be a probation officer for similar conduct of his probationer. The very unofficial nature of the informal juvenile
justice system makes measurement of effectiveness very difficult
if not impossible.
Even worse than the formal system's lack of a system
manager is the lack of any meaningful supervision or coordination in the informal juvenile justice system. Agencies which
receive official referrals from the juvenile court or. family court
must meet various requirements and may be subject to inspection and evaluation, but few such requirements exist for the
agencies of the informal system since no official referral may be
made. The children and their families are free to "voluntarily"
participate in any activity which is not in itself illegal, regardless
of the nature of the activity or the imposition upon the life of the
child. While there might exist an "officially approved" list of
informal youth service agencies, referrals to these agencies are
typically made privately by individual agents. There is a total
absence of any public hearing or even any record of what
recommendation was made to the child by the agent. Thus, the
appropriateness of the recommendation may be limited only by
the agent's particular faith in Jesus, transcendental meditation,
team sports, or mountain climbing.
A fundamental problem lies with the present lack of any
control over these agencies by the formal juvenile justice system.
The formal system should continue to be aware of the services
provided by these agencies and make this information available
to all children and families in the community, including those
children of official interest to the formal system. However, the
formal system should take measures to determine the goals and
operating principles of these various agencies and refuse to
recommend any agency which would not be utilized under a
formal probation program. For example, specifically religious
groups might be excluded because of first amendment religious
freedoms. Agencies presenting rather severe intrusions into a
child's life should not be recommended out of respect for the
child's right to privacy. This is not to say that these agencies
would be prohibited from working with children, but simply that
they would be excluded from the informal juvenile justice system
to the extent they are utilized by the formal system.
One final problem with the informal system is the unbridled discretion exercised by its agents. The informal system is a

personification of the rules of men, not of law, 'and in this
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respect differs from the fundamental premise of American sociolegal systems. In the informal system, decisions are made almost totally by persons unsupervised in any meaningful way and
unchecked by any systemic force. For example, if an informal
system agent decides that a certain child needs to participate in
group counseling which involves intense personal attacks upon
him by the group, that child must either participate in these
sessions or be deemed a failure by that agent, by the agency, and
typically, since such activity may comprise the child's only experience within the system, by the informal juvenile justice system
as a whole. Whether or not the group counseling was appropriate for that child and whether the group counseling was conducted in a reasonable manner are questions that may never be
raised.
The socialized era of the formal juvenile justice system
reflected a similar system for handling delinquent children. In
that system the agents had almost total power over a child and
could decide upon proper activities for the child without having
their decisions effectively challenged. The bases for their decisions were almost never revealed and yet were very important
factors in the treatment of delinquents. If a child's personal
mannerisms were offensive to the agent, a rather severe sanction
could be imposed without revealing the true reasons for that
decision. The Gault decision and numerous observers have
soundly criticized unchecked discretion for decision-makers with
such awesome power over the lives of children. As a result, the
socialized juvenile justice system was officially abolished and
replaced by the constitutionalized or proceduralized juvenile
justice system.6 1 Juvenile justice agents with such great powers
over children were required to follow fairly rigid procedures and
their discretion was greatly reduced.
Notwithstanding Gault, the socialized juvenile justice system is alive and well and living within the informal juvenile
justice system. The attitudes, prejudices, and discretionary
practices which characterized the socialized system were simply
transplanted into the informal system to provide room for the
constitutionalized system. As a result of Gault and its progeny,
the juvenile court judge can not escape the constitutionalized
juvenile justice system and he remains largely a captive within its
confines. However, the role of the juvenile court judge is now
being played by the juvenile probation officer and by other
youth counselors.
The juvenile probation officer is now the person who, like
his predecessor, may accept without effective challenge the truth
61. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
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of accusations against the child, examine the "whole child,"
including any personal characteristics he thinks important, and
draw from his wisdom the proper course for the child to follow.
As with the judge in the socialized system, this decision is
effectively impossible to challenge without encountering a cure
worse than the disease. No attorney represents the child's side
of the case, no hearings are conducted, no particular procedures
are followed, and no persuasive amount or kind of evidence
must be produced. The child is simply accused of doing something authoritative adults find objectionable and is forced to
accept often significant interference in his life. The formal
alternative is something all of the apparently knowledgeable
adults agree is much worse.
The child caught up in the informal juvenile justice system
receives one particularly cruel punishment never imposed upon
children that were involved in the socialized juvenile justice
system. In the socialized era, the children were never promised
a fair hearing or a chance to challenge their accusers. They
knew from the beginning that adults would decide their fate and
they could only accept it. In the informal system, however,
children enter having been taught about justice for the accused
and their right to their day in court, only to find such rhetoric to
be thwarted by the system's own processes.
The informal system must be proceduralized as was the
socialized system. Decisions having significant impact upon
children and their families must be subject to review by objective
persons and according to objective, non-discriminatory principles. For the same reasons we protect children from the socialized system we must proceduralize the informal system. The
only solution, albeit a most regretful one, is to remove as much
discretion as possible from all agents of the informal system. As
was persuasively explained in Gault, following proper procedures need not prevent agents and agencies from serving the
needs of children."2 These agents should simply reveal the true
bases for their decisions, subject those decisions to the scrutiny
of supervisors and others, and impose only minimum-intervention treatment programs upon children.
CONCLUSION

Procedural due process is not a cure-all and cannot be
relied upon to solve the many problems in juvenile justice.
However, a legal system for children devoid of procedural due
process was utilized, studied, and found insufficient after almost
62. See id. at 26.
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seventy years of operation. Almost ten years ago, when the
socialized system was rejected, a constitutionalized system
emerged characterized by procedural due process. Now, even
before the constitutionalized system has been fully implemented
in many jurisdictions, another "socialized" system has developed. Once again, procedural fairness for children is being
denied.
History tells us that as soon as we proceduralize the informal system a third parallel system may emerge again to divert
children away from proceduralized systems and process them in
a discretionary manner. It seems as if persons who work with
troubled children actually refuse to give up their discretionary
power. If these people are denied overt exercise of that power
in one dimension, they will simply find another dimension in
which to act. When discretion was revoked from the judge, it
seemed to migrate to the probation officer. If we take discretion away from the probation officer, will the juvenile police
officer become the new surrogate judge or will it be another
agent as yet unknown to juvenile justice? The very nature of
juvenile justice agents is apparently to do what they think best
for children under their control and to find inventive ways to
accomplish this end in spite of laws, regulations, and job descriptions.
This phenomenon suggests a belief among juvenile justice
agents in unchecked discretion and in the inappropriateness of
procedural protections for children. Juvenile justice agents and
agencies which see themselves as serving humanity may understandably have less concern for procedure than for meaningful results. They believe that procedural requirements are
meaningless if the children being served receive nothing of value
from the system/servant. Such juvenile justice agents look first
to the value of the services being provided to the children
and then try to fit the service-providing activities within the
general requirements of law. If the agent perceives that the
child "obviously needs" professional counseling, but due process
of law makes imposition of such counseling difficult if not
impossible, then the child may be coerced into "volunteering"
for unofficial, informal probation so that the necessary services
can be delivered. In this manner, the procedural requirements
are followed only so long as they do not hinder the achievement
of the desired result, as perceived by the agent. Inventive means
can be and are devised to circumvent the procedural requirements whenever necessary. This clash between procedure and results will be largely unavoidable as long as the system is partly a
legal system and partly a social welfare system. However, propo-
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nents of either objective should understand the reasons behind
the strong desires for each objective. The primary problem lies
with those people who stress results regardless of procedural
requirements. Such proponents must be educated in the basic
Anglo-American legal premise of "rule of law, not of men" and
the understandable desire of our society to avoid despotism,
regardless of whether it is centered in the White House, the
court, or the juvenile probation office. For many reasons firmly
rooted in the experiences of the human race, despots claiming
benevolence as their sole motivation are to be avoided. By
applying procedural rules equally to all cases, the dangers of
despotism can be avoided and the desired results for children
and for society can still be achieved.

